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We consider the problem of privacy in direct communications, showing how quantum mechanics
can be useful to guarantee a certain level of confidentiality. In particular, we review a continuous
variable approach recently proposed by us [S. Pirandola et al., Europhys. Lett. 84, 20013 (2008)].
Here, we analyze the degree of privacy of this technique against a broader class of attacks, which
includes non-Gaussian eavesdropping.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics provides a nice solution to an old
cryptographic problem, i.e., the key distribution prob-
lem [1]. Going further, we consider whether or not quan-
tum mechanics could profitably be exploited even for di-
rect confidential communication, without resorting to the
use of pre-distributed private keys. Since many quantum
communication protocols like quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1] and quantum teleportation [2] have been ex-
tended to continuous variable systems [3, 4], i.e., quan-
tum systems associated to infinite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces [5], we find it rather natural to address the prob-
lem of direct communication in this framework. Here, an
important role has been played by the bosonic modes of
the radiation field, and Gaussian states. In particular,
coherent states of the radiation have become the most
appealing choice for implementing many quantum infor-
mation tasks. Along this line, we have shown [6] how
a sender (Alice) can exploit coherent states of a bosonic
mode in order to send confidential messages to a receiver
(Bob), with an acceptable degree of privacy. This is the
first proof-of-principle of a (quasi) confidential quantum
direct communication (QDC) in the framework of con-
tinuous variable systems. In particular, this QDC can be
implemented in an easy way, since it exploits the same
“quantum hardware” of the standard continuous variable
QKD, even if this is done via a completely different logic
of classical operations and communications [7]. The price
one pays in order to have a simple technique of QDC is
that a notion of “degree of privacy” must replace the one
of unconditional security (used in QKD). This means that
we allow a potential eavesdropper (Eve) to access a lim-
ited fraction of the information, even if this fraction can
be evaluated in advance and also made very small.
The ideal situation for a QDC occurs when Alice and
Bob are connected by a noiseless channel, so that the
unique noise they have to correct is due to the continuous
structure of quantum phase-space [8]. However, in gen-
eral, this is not the case and the honest users must ran-
domly switch instances of direct communication with in-
stances of statistical checks on the quantum channel. As
soon as they detect the presence of a non-tolerable noise,
they promptly stop the communication. The maximum
noise that can be tolerated is connected to the maximum
amount of information that they are willing to give up to
an eavesdropper. In other words, a good QDC protocol
should enable Alice and Bob to communicate the entire
message when the noise is suitably low, while losing a
small amount of information when it is not. According
to Ref. [6], the maximum information that Eve can steal
can be made small at will, but at the expenses of the ef-
ficiency of the protocol, corresponding to the ratio of the
number of communicated bits to the number of quantum
systems used. An alternative approach consists in the
use of classical error correcting codes, which makes Eve’s
perturbation more evident to Alice and Bob’s statistical
checks. This approach enables the honest users to re-
duce the number of stolen bits while keeping fixed the
efficiency of the protocol. This improvement is proven
assuming the model of eavesdropping is also taken fixed,
i.e., Eve is restricted to a Gaussian attack given by a
universal Gaussian cloner.
In the present paper we thoroughly review the re-
sults of Ref. [6], giving a more detailed description of
the various protocols for QDC, together with the basic
ideas which are behind them. Furthermore, we provide a
deeper analysis of the possible eavesdropping strategies.
In particular, we consider new kinds of attacks which are
non-Gaussian and consist in the intermittent use of Gaus-
sian cloners. These intermittent attacks are proven to be
more powerful in the eavesdropping of QDC when it is
aided by classical error correction. As a result, the im-
provement given by the classical codes is no longer clear if
Eve is also allowed to optimize her strategy. Despite this
open problem, the new concepts and the basic schemes
for QDC have still great potentialities to be explored.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we review
the basic protocol for QDC together with its Gaussian
eavesdropping. In the following Sec. III, we review QDC
with repetition codes. Its security analysis is performed
in Sec. III C for Gaussian eavesdropping, and Sec. III D
for a non-Gaussian generalization. Finally, after the con-
2clusions of Sec. IV, we have added a discussion on possi-
ble variants for QDC in Appendix VI.
II. BASIC PROTOCOL FOR QUANTUM
DIRECT COMMUNICATION
A. Continuous variables of a bosonic mode
Let us consider a bosonic mode with Hilbert space H
and ladder operators aˆ, aˆ† satisfying [aˆ, aˆ†] = 1. Equiva-
lently, this system can be described by a pair of quadra-
ture operators
qˆ =
aˆ+ aˆ†√
2
, pˆ =
aˆ− aˆ†
i
√
2
, (1)
satisfying the dimensionless canonical commutation rela-
tion (CCR) [qˆ, pˆ] = i. From the previous CCR we see
that an arbitrary state of the system ρ must fulfill the
uncertainty principle
V (qˆ)V (pˆ) ≥ 1/4 , (2)
where V (xˆ) := Tr(ρxˆ2) − [Tr(ρxˆ)]2 denotes the variance
of an arbitrary quadrature xˆ = qˆ or pˆ. In particular, an
arbitrary coherent state |α¯〉 saturates Eq. (2) symmet-
rically, i.e., V (qˆ) = V (pˆ) := ∆ = 1/2, where the value
1/2 quantifies the so-called quantum shot-noise. This is
the fundamental noise that affects the disjoint measure-
ments of the quadratures qˆ and pˆ of a coherent state (via
homodyne detection [9]). Such a noise is instead doubled
to ∆ = 1 when the two quadratures are measured jointly
(via heterodyne detection [9]).
According to the Wigner representation, an arbitrary
density operator ρ is equivalent to a characteristic func-
tion χ(λ) := Tr[ρDˆ(λ)], where Dˆ(λ) := exp(λaˆ† − λ∗aˆ)
is the displacement operator. Equivalently, ρ can be de-
scribed by aWigner function, which is a quasi-probability
distribution defined by the Fourier transform
W (α) :=
∫
C
d2λ
pi2
exp (λ∗α−λα∗)χ(λ) . (3)
In Eq. (3), the Cartesian decomposition of the complex
variable α = (q + ip)/
√
2 provides the real eigenvalues q
and p of the quadrature operators of Eq. (1). Such vari-
ables span the phase-space K = {q, p} of the system and,
therefore, represent its fundamental continuous variables.
For a coherent state |α¯〉, the Wigner function takes the
form
W|α¯〉(α) = G1/2(α− α¯) , (4)
where
GV (α− α¯) := 1
piV
exp
(
−|α− α¯|
2
V
)
(5)
is a complex Gaussian function with mean α¯ and variance
V . As a consequence, the measurement of the arbitrary
quadrature xˆ provides outcomes x which are distributed
according to the real Gaussian
G∆(x − x¯) = 1√
2pi∆
exp
[
− (x− x¯)
2
2∆
]
, (6)
where ∆ = 1/2 for homodyne detection, while ∆ = 1 for
heterodyne detection.
B. Phase-space lattice encoding
Let us discretize the phase-space K by introducing a
square lattice whose unit cell has size equal to 2Ω (see
Fig. 1). An arbitrary cell can be addressed by a pair
of integer indices (u, u′) and its center specified by the
coordinates
qu = 2Ωu , pu′ = 2Ωu
′ , (7)
or, equivalently, by the complex amplitude
αuu′ =
qu + ipu′√
2
. (8)
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FIG. 1: Square lattice of step size 2Ω in the phase-space. The
center of each cell is specified by an amplitude αuu′ , where
(u, u′) is a pair of integers representing the address of the
cell. Each address (u, u′) is associated with a pair of bits
(U,U ′) given by the parities of u and u′ (see the binary digits
at the figure’s border). The picture also shows the masking
procedure which adds a mask αM to the amplitude αuu′ in
order to create a continuous and Gaussian signal α¯.
Thanks to the introduction of this discrete structure,
two bits of information may be simply encoded in quan-
tum phase-space. In fact, an arbitrary cell of address
3(u, u′) can be associated with a pair of bits (U,U ′), rep-
resenting the parities of the indices u and u′. In this ap-
proach, Alice encodes two classical bits (U,U ′) by choos-
ing a cell whose address (u, u′) is randomly selected ac-
cording to the relations
u = 2m+ U , u′ = 2m′ + U ′ , (9)
wherem andm′ are random integers [10]. Then, she con-
siders the complex amplitude αuu′ pointing at the center
of that cell and prepares a corresponding coherent state
|αuu′〉. Such a state is finally sent to Bob, who performs a
heterodyne detection in order to estimate the amplitude
αuu′ and therefore the encoded information (U,U
′). It is
clear that, even in the presence of a noiseless communi-
cation channel, Bob’s decoding cannot be noiseless since
the Gaussian shape of the coherent state spreads over the
whole of phase space. Such a spread inevitably leads to
an intrinsic error in the decoding process which occurs
when the coherent state is projected by the measurement
to wrong peripheral cells.
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FIG. 2: Intrinsic error probability ε(Ω) in the decoding of
Alice’s bit U from the q-quadrature of the coherent state.
Let us evaluate the probability ε of an intrinsic error
when Bob decodes Alice’s bit U from the position quadra-
ture qˆ (the argument may be repeated for the other
quadrature). Since Bob performs a heterodyne detec-
tion on the coherent state, the measured value q will be
distributed around qu according to a Gaussian distribu-
tion with noise-variance equal to ∆ = 1, i.e., G1(q − qu).
Suppose, for simplicity, that U = 0 is encoded in qu = 0.
According to Fig. 2 an error occurs whenever the mea-
sured value q falls in one of the crossed cells, i.e., having
odd index u = ±1,±3, ... (which would lead to the in-
correct reconstruction of U = 1 by Bob). Hence, the
probability of an intrinsic error (per quadrature) is equal
to
ε(Ω) = 2
∞∑
j=0
∫ (4j+3)Ω
(4j+1)Ω
dq G1(q) . (10)
Now, if we fix a tolerable value for the intrinsic error
probability, we find the corresponding size Ω to be used
for the lattice. In particular, tolerating ε = 1% implies
adopting Ω ≃ 2.57. On the one hand, the use of a low
value for ε enables the honest users to approach noise-free
communication. On the other hand, a large value for Ω
makes the protocol particularly fragile to eavesdropping.
In fact, Eve can optimize her attack on the structure of
the lattice, e.g., by using a non-universal cloner which
is optimized on the centers of the cells. More simply,
Eve can detect the state, reconstruct its cell, and resend
another state which is centered in that cell. By resorting
to this intercept-center-resend strategy, Eve is able to
remove the noise most of the time for a sufficiently large
Ω. Luckily, we are able to preclude such strategies by
resorting to the classical procedure shown in the next
section.
C. Masking the message and testing the channel
In order to hide the lattice from Eve, Alice can simply
add a mask to her message. After the computation of the
message amplitude αuu′ , Alice classically adds a mask
amplitude αM , in such a way that the total amplitude
α¯ := αM + αuu′ is randomly distributed according to a
complex Gaussian GV (α¯) with large variance V ≫ Ω (see
Fig. 1). Operationally, the whole encoding procedure
goes as follows:
(1) Lattice Encoding. Alice encodes the message bits
(U,U ′) into a message amplitude αuu′ .
(2) Masking. Alice picks a signal amplitude α¯ from a
wide Gaussian distribution and computes the mask
αM = α¯− αuu′ connecting signal and message.
(3) Quantum Preparation. Alice prepares a signal
coherent state |α¯〉 to be sent to Bob.
Having prepared the triplet: αuu′ (message), αM (mask)
and |α¯〉 (signal state), Alice can now perform her quan-
tum and classical communications (see Fig. 3). First,
Alice sends the signal state |α¯〉 to Bob, who heterodynes
it with outcome β ≃ α¯. Then, after Bob’s detection [11],
Alice classically publicizes the mask αM . After these two
steps, Bob gets the pair (β, αM ) from his detection and
Alice’s classical communication. Then, Bob is able to un-
mask the signal by computing β−αM ≃ α¯−αM = αuu′
and, therefore, estimates the message bits (U,U ′) via lat-
tice decoding.
Clearly, the same decoding steps can be followed by
Eve too. However, the key point is that Eve must choose
the probing interaction before knowing the value of the
mask. Since the signal α¯ is continuous (Gaussian) and
highly modulated, Eve is prevented from using any kind
of interaction which privileges a particular portion of
the phase space. The most natural choice is therefore
a universal Gaussian interaction. A possible model is
4given by the universal Gaussian quantum cloning ma-
chine (UGQCM) [12]. Such a machine maps the signal
state |α¯〉 into a pair of output clones ρB (sent to Bob)
and ρE (taken by Eve), each one equal to a Gaussian
modulation of |α¯〉 〈α¯|, i.e.,
ρK =
∫
d2µ Gσ2
K
(µ) Dˆ(µ)|α¯〉〈α¯|Dˆ†(µ) , (K = B,E) ,
(11)
where the cloning-noise variances σ2B and σ
2
E symmet-
rically affect the quadratures and satisfy the optimality
condition
σ2Bσ
2
E = 1/4 , (12)
directly imposed by Eq. (2) [13]. As a consequence of
Eq. (11), the arbitrary quadrature xˆ of the clone K =
B,E has a marginal distribution equal to G∆+σ2
K
(x− x¯).
The performance of the resulting attack will be explicitly
studied in the next Section IID.
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FIG. 3: Message mode (MM). From the message bits
(U,U ′), Alice computes the message amplitude αuu′ (lattice
encoding) and then adds the mask αM achieving the signal
amplitude α¯. Then, Alice prepares and sends to Bob the
signal state |α¯〉, which is heterodyned by Bob with outcome
β (step 1 in the picture). After detection, Bob classically
informs Alice (step 2) and, then, Alice classically communi-
cates the mask αM (step 3). Finally, Bob is able to unmask
the signal (β − αM ), thus reconstructing αuu′ and, therefore,
(U,U ′).
The above procedure of directly communicating mes-
sage bits is called the message mode (MM) of the proto-
col. However, Alice and Bob must also understand how
much the channel is perturbed during the communica-
tion process, in order to control the amount of informa-
tion which is left to a potential eavesdropper. Assuming
an attack with UGQCM, this corresponds to estimating
the value of the noise σ2B := σ
2 which is added by Eve to
the channel. A real-time check of this noise is possible if
Alice randomly switches from instances of message mode
to suitable instances of control mode (CM). In control
mode, Alice does not process any text message but only
prepares and sends the signal state |α¯〉 (see Fig. 4). Then,
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FIG. 4: Control mode (CM). Alice picks up a Gaussian
amplitude α¯ and prepares a coherent state |α¯〉. Such a state
is sent to Bob and heterodyned with outcome β (step 1 in
the picture). Then, Bob classically informs Alice (step 2) and
Alice communicates the value of the signal α¯ (step 3). Finally,
Bob computes the test variable τ := β−α¯ to infer the amount
of noise σ2 in the channel.
after Bob’s detection (outcome β), Alice communicates
the value α¯ of the signal amplitude. At that point, Bob
extracts from (β, α¯) the actual value of the test variable
τ := β − α¯ which is then used to infer the total noise
∆B = 1+ σ
2 affecting the signal. As soon as they recog-
nize a non-tolerable noise, i.e., σ2 > σ˜2 for some thresh-
old noise σ˜2, they stop the communication. Hereafter, we
assume a zero-tolerance protocol where no added noise is
tolerated on the channel, i.e., σ˜2 = 0. We shall see that
the QDC protocol can be applied in realistic situations
even with such a strict condition [14].
Let us show how the real-time check of the quantum
channel works in detail. Let us consider the Cartesian de-
composition τ = (q+ip)/
√
2 of Bob’s test variable. If the
channel is noiseless, then the arbitrary quadrature x = q
or p is only affected by heterodyne noise ∆ = 1, i.e., it is
distributed according to a Gaussian distribution G1(x).
By contrast, if Eve perturbs the quantum channel using
a UGQCM with noise σ2 6= 0, then x follows a wider
Gaussian distribution G1+σ2(x). By reconstructing the
experimental distribution of x from consecutive outcomes
{x1, x2, · · · }, Bob must therefore distinguish between the
two theoretical distributions G1(x) and G1+σ2(x). In
other words, Bob must distinguish between the two hy-
potheses {
H0 : (Eve = no) ⇔ σ2 = 0 ,
H1 : (Eve = yes)⇔ σ2 6= 0 . (13)
Let us fix the confidence level r of this hypothesis test,
i.e., the probability to reject H0 though it is true. This
level must be sufficiently low (e.g., r = 5 × 10−7), so
that the direct communication can be effectively com-
pleted in absence of Eve. For each instance of control
mode, Bob makes two independent tests, one for each
quadrature. Hence, after M control modes, he has col-
lected 2M quadratures values {q1, p1, · · · , qM , pM} :=
5{x1, x2, · · · , x2M−1, x2M} and he can construct the es-
timator
v :=
2M∑
l=1
x2l . (14)
Then, the hypothesis H0 is accepted if and only if
v < V2M,1−r , (15)
where Vi,j is the jth quantile of the χ2 distribution with
i degrees of freedom. In other words, Alice and Bob
continue their direct communication in MM as long as
the condition of Eq. (15) is satisfied in CM.
D. Gaussian eavesdropping
Let us explicitly analyze what happens when the quan-
tum communication channel is subject to Gaussian eaves-
dropping via a UGQCM. In an individual UGQCM at-
tack (see Fig. 5), Eve clones the signal input and, then,
heterodynes her output to derive her estimate γ of the
signal amplitude α¯. After the release of the mask’s value
αM , Eve infers the message amplitude αuu′ and, there-
fore, the input bits (U,U ′). In this process, Eve intro-
duces an added noise σ2 on the Alice-Bob channel (i.e.,
∆B = 1 + σ
2), while her output is affected by a total
noise equal to ∆E = 1+ (4σ
2)−1. This is the sum of the
cloning noise σ2E = (4σ
2)−1, given by the UGQCM, and
the measurement noise ∆ = 1, given by the heterodyne
detector.
σ2
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αMβ - αuu’=
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41/
FIG. 5: Individual UGQCM attack. Eve uses a UGQCM to
eavesdrop the quantum communication line. Eve heterodynes
her clone to get her estimate γ of the signal amplitude α¯.
After the public unmasking of the signal, Eve estimates αuu′
and, therefore, the message bits (U,U ′).
First of all, we must evaluate the probability of accept-
ing H0 (hence continuing the communication) notwith-
standing the presence of Eve. In other words, we must
compute the probability ΠM (σ
2) that Eve evadesM con-
trol modes while introducing a noise σ2 6= 0. After M
control modes, the estimator of Eq. (14) follows the dis-
tribution
PM (v) =
vM−1
2M (M − 1)!(1 + σ2)M exp
[
− v
2(1 + σ2)
]
.
(16)
As a consequence, the probability to accept H0 is equal
to
ΠM (σ
2) =
∫ V2M,1−r
0
dν PM (v)
=
Γ(M, 0)− Γ
(
M,
V2M,1−r
2(1+σ2)
)
(M − 1)! , (17)
where
Γ(z, a) :=
∫ +∞
a
dt tz−1e−t (18)
is the incomplete gamma function.
Besides Eve’s survival probability of Eq. (17), we must
also evaluate the amount of information that Eve can
get during her undetected life on the channel. Such a
quantity is limited by the total noise experienced by Eve,
which is equal to ∆E = 1 + (4σ
2)−1. For a given ∆E ,
we now calculate the average information Eve can steal
in a single run of MM. Starting from the outcome of
the measurement γ and the knowledge of the mask αM ,
Eve estimates Alice’s amplitude αuu′ via the variable γ−
αM . The corresponding quadrature x will be distributed
according to a Gaussian distribution G∆E (x−xu). Then,
by repeating the same derivation leading to Eq. (10), we
can compute Eve’s error probability in decoding Alice’s
bit (U or U ′), which is equal to
p(∆E) = 2
∞∑
j=0
∫ (4j+3)Ω
(4j+1)Ω
dx G∆E (x) . (19)
Let us assume that every message bit is a bit of infor-
mation, i.e., the input message is not compressible. As
a consequence, the average amount of information which
is eavesdropped in a single MM is given by
IAE(∆E) = 2{1−H [p(∆E)]} , (20)
where
H(p) := −p log p− (1− p) log(1 − p) . (21)
By replacing ∆E = 1 + (4σ
2)−1 := ∆E(σ
2) in Eq. (20),
we derive IAE = IAE(σ
2), i.e., the average amount of
information which is stolen for a given noise σ2 in Alice-
Bob channel. Such a quantity can be directly combined
with ΠM = ΠM (σ
2) of Eq. (17). This means that we
can express Eve’s survival probability as a function of
the stolen information. In fact, let us fix the probabil-
ity c of a control mode, so that N runs of the protocol
can be divided into cN control modes and (1− c)N mes-
sage modes, on average. As a consequence, Eve’s survival
probability is equal to
ΠcN (σ
2) := P , (22)
6and the average number of stolen bits is equal to
(1 − c)NIAE(σ2) := I . (23)
Then, for every σ2, we can consider the function P =
P (I). In particular, let us fix c = 69/70, so that the
protocol has efficiency
E := number of bits
number of transmitted systems
=
1
35
. (24)
For several values of σ2, we can (numerically) evaluate
the function P = P (I) as shown in Fig. 6. From this fig-
ure, we can see that, if the noise is low, e.g., σ2 = 0.01,
Eve steals very little information (≃ 1 bit) while Alice
and Bob complete an almost noiseless QDC. In partic-
ular, Alice is able to transmit ≃ 1.5 × 104 bits of infor-
mation by using N ≃ 5 × 105 systems. Notice that the
maximum length of the QDC is roughly bounded by the
verification of r−1 hypothesis tests and, therefore, it is
limited to about 4(1− c)(cr)−1 bits (i.e., ≃ 1.2× 105 bits
or ≃ 4 × 106 systems using the above parameters). If
the attack is more noisy (e.g., σ2 = 1), Eve again steals
little information (≃ 1 bit). In such a case, in fact, Eve
is promptly detected by the honest parties who, how-
ever, are prevented from exchanging information (denial
of service). According to Fig. 6, Eve’s best strategy cor-
responds to using a UGQCM with σ2 ≃ 1/20, so that
she can steal a maximal amount of about 80 bits before
being revealed (using a cut off of P = 1%). In such a
case, Alice transmits ≃ 630 bits by using N ≃ 2.2× 104
systems.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
I
P
0.05
0.20.02
0.4
0.01
FIG. 6: Survival probability P versus the number of stolen
bits I . QDC with parameters Ω = 2.57 and c = 69/70 (so
that ε = 1% and E = 1/35). The curves refer to individual
UGQCM attacks with different values of added noise σ2.
How can we decrease the maximal amount of stolen
information? The simplest solution consists in increas-
ing the control mode probability c, so that the possible
presence of Eve is detected before sending too many bits.
Clearly, this approach has a price to pay, which is a de-
crease of the efficiency E of the protocol. An alternative
solution consists of making the decoding more sensitive
to the presence of added noise. Such an approach is pos-
sible by introducing classical error correcting codes, and
its pros and cons are explored in the following section.
In particular, this solution is good against Gaussian at-
tacks but its advantages are not completely clear in the
presence of non-Gaussian attacks.
III. QUANTUM DIRECT COMMUNICATION
WITH REPETITION CODES
A. The basic idea in using classical codes
In the basic scheme of QDC with continuous variables,
a noiseless communication is possible up to an intrinsic
error probability ε which depends on the step Ω of the
phase-space lattice. In particular, such a probability de-
creases for increasing Ω. An alternative way for decreas-
ing ε consists of leaving Ω unchanged while introducing
a classical error correcting code for encoding/decoding.
Such procedures are equivalent for a noiseless channel,
since ε is sufficiently small and the codes work very well
in that case. However, the scenario is different as the
channel becomes nosier. In such a case, in fact, the cor-
recting codes have a non-linear behavior which makes
their performance rapidly deteriorate. Such a non-linear
effect can be exploited to critically split the correction ca-
pabilities, and therefore the information gains, between
Alice-Bob channel and Alice-Eve channel.
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FIG. 7: Probability of an uncorrectable error Pn versus the
single bit-flip probability p. Here, we consider repetition codes
with n = 7, 15, 35, 103.
Let us consider the simple case of an n-bit repetition
code, where an input bit U = {0, 1} is encoded into a
logical bit U¯ = {0¯, 1¯} of n physical bits via the codewords
0¯ = 00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, 1¯ = 11 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. (25)
By choosing an odd n = 2m + 1 (with m = 1, 2, · · · ),
we can apply a non-ambiguous majority voting criterion.
This means that every bit-flip error of weight t < m+ 1
7is correctable, while every bit-flip error of weight t ≥
m+1 is not. Let us now consider a memoryless channel,
where each physical bit is perturbed independently with
the same bit-flip probability p, as happens in the case of
individual Gaussian attacks. Then, the probability of an
uncorrectable error is simply given by
Pn(p) =
n∑
k=m+1
(
n
k
)
pk(1 − p)n−k . (26)
As it is evident from Fig. 7, the correction capability of
the n-bit repetition code rapidly worsens as the single
bit-flip probability approaches 1/2. This is due to the
non-linear behavior of Pn = Pn(p) which becomes more
manifest when n increases. In particular, for a sufficiently
large n, the curve displays a critical point p˜ after which
the correction capability suddenly starts to deteriorate
very quickly (e.g., p˜ ≃ 0.3 for n = 35 and p˜ ≃ 0.4 for
n = 103). Exactly these critical points can be exploited
to improve the QDC, by transforming the communication
protocol into a threshold process, where the sensitivity to
added noise is remarkably amplified.
For a repetition code of fixed length n, we have a cor-
responding critical value p˜. Then, we can choose a lattice
whose step is critical. This is the value Ω˜ such that the
intrinsic error probability is critical, i.e., ε(Ω˜) = p˜. On
the one hand, when the channel is noiseless, Bob is able
to recover the codewords and reconstruct the logical bit
with a very low error probability PB = Pn(p˜). On the
other hand, when the channel is noisy, Alice’s informa-
tion is split into two sub-channels: the Alice-Bob channel,
with added noise σ2B := σ
2, and the Alice-Eve channel,
with added noise σ2E = (4σ
2)−1. The corresponding error
probabilities are respectively given by
PB = Pn(p˜+ pB) , PE = Pn(p˜+ pE) , (27)
where pB = pB(σ
2
B) and pE = pE(σ
2
E) are monotonic
functions of the added noises (and, therefore, linked by
the uncertainty principle). Now, if Eve tries to hide her-
self by perturbing the Alice-Bob channel with a relatively
small pB, then her dual pE will always be big enough to
perturb p˜ into the nonlinear region. As a consequence,
Eve will tend to experience PE ≃ 1/2 gaining her negli-
gible information.
Let us explain the previous point in terms of mutual
information. In particular, let us fix the repetition code
to the value n = 35, so that we have p˜ ≃ 0.3 and a cor-
responding critical value Ω˜ ≃ 1 for the lattice. Starting
from an arbitrary Ω, one can see that Ω˜ is indeed optimal
for Alice and Bob. For every bit of information which is
encoded by Alice, the amount of information decoded by
Bob and Eve is respectively given by
IAB = 1−H(PB) := IAB(Ω, σ2) , (28)
IAE = 1−H(PE) := IAE(Ω, σ2) , (29)
where PB and PE are the logical error probabilities in
Eq. (27) with n = 35. Since the added noises satisfy the
uncertainty relation of Eq. (12), a similar relation holds
for the mutual informations, i.e.,
IAB(Ω, σ
2) + IAE(Ω, σ
2) = µ(Ω, σ2) , (30)
where µ(Ω, σ2) ≤ 2 is numerically shown in Fig. 8. Let
us also consider the difference of information
D(Ω, σ2) :=
∣∣IAB(Ω, σ2)− IAE(Ω, σ2)∣∣ . (31)
Such a quantity is a point-by-point measure of how much
IAB and IAE are different. In particular, the maximum
value D = 1 corresponds to the maximal separation
{IAB, IAE} = {0, 1} or {1, 0}. As we can see from Fig. 9,
the points (Ω, σ2) with Ω = 1 (i.e., with Ω ≃ Ω˜) cor-
responds to the broadest areas of separation. In other
words, the critical condition Ω ≃ Ω˜ enhances the split
between IAB and IAE .
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FIG. 8: Sum of the mutual informations IAB + IAE on the
plane (Ω, σ2). The values increase from 0 (white area) to 2
(black area). Note how the behavior of the borders changes
around the critical value Ω˜ ≃ 1.
B. Protocol with repetition codes
Let us explicitly show how to use an n-bit repetition
code for encoding/decoding. This is possible by simply
adding pre-encoding and post-decoding classical steps to
the basic protocol of Sec. II. The message bits (U,U ′)
are pre-encoded into a pair of logical bits
U¯ = U1U2 · · ·Un , U¯ ′ = U ′1U ′2 · · ·U ′n , (32)
via the n-bit repetition code. Each pair of physical bits
(Uk, U
′
k) is then subject to the same encoding as before,
i.e., lattice encoding (Uk, U
′
k) → αuku′k := αk, masking
αk → αk + αM = α¯ and quantum preparation α¯ → |α¯〉.
Then, after n message modes, Bob will have collected
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FIG. 9: Difference D := |IAB − IAE| on the plane (Ω, σ
2).
The values increase from D = 0 (white area) to D = 1 (black
area). Notice how the areas of separation (black areas) are
broader at the critical value Ω˜ ≃ 1.
perturbed versions of the n pairs (U1, U
′
1), · · · , (Un, U ′n).
By applying standard error recovery (majority voting),
he will then perform the post-decoding of (U,U ′). In
the same way as before, these instances of message mode
(each one carrying a single physical bit of a codeword)
must be randomly switched with instances of control
mode, where Alice skips encoding and simply sends Gaus-
sian signals α¯ for testing the channel (exactly as in
Fig. 4).
Let us choose a repetition code with n = 35, and a
lattice with Ω = 1 ≃ Ω˜. The latter choice implies an in-
trinsic error probability ε, in decoding the physical bits
(Uk, U
′
k), which is equal to the critical value of the code
p˜ ≃ 32%. After error recovery, the intrinsic error prob-
ability ε¯ affecting the logical bits (U¯ , U¯ ′) is sufficiently
low and corresponds to P35(p˜) ≃ 1%. Then, let us also
choose c = 1/2 for the control mode’s probability, so that
we have an efficiency E = 1/35. Notice that the values
of ε¯ and E correspond to the ones chosen for the basic
protocol of Sec. II (where ε¯ = ε of course). Such parame-
ters equalize the performances of the two protocols in the
case of noiseless quantum channel. As a consequence, we
are in a situation to make a fair comparison between the
protocols when malicious noise is present on the channel.
C. Gaussian eavesdropping
Let us analyze the effect of an individual UGQCM
attack. On every cloned system, affected by a noise
σ2E = (4σ
2)−1, Eve detects the complex amplitude γ
via heterodyne detection. Then, she estimates the sig-
nal amplitude α¯ up to a total noise ∆E = 1 + σ
2
E . Af-
ter Alice’s declaration of the mask αM , Eve derives the
message amplitude and, therefore, a pair of physical bits
(Uk, U
′
k). Each physical bit will be affected by an error
probability p(∆E) as in Eq. (19). After n eavesdropped
message modes, Eve will be able to decode Alice’s logical
bits (U¯ , U¯ ′) by majority voting, up to an error probabil-
ity PE = Pn[p(∆E)] [see Eq. (26)]. For each logical bit,
the acquired information is simply equal to 1 −H(PE).
As a consequence, for each message mode, Eve acquires
on average
IAE(σ
2) = 2[1−H(PE)]/n (33)
bits of information (simply because 2 logical bits are sent
via n physical systems).
Now, let us consider the probability that Eve evades
M control modes. Since the control mode is implemented
exactly as before, we have again ΠM (σ
2) as in Eq. (17).
Such a quantity can be combined with the one of Eq. (33).
After N runs of the protocol, we have an average of cN
control modes and (1−c)N message modes, so that Eve’s
survival probability is again ΠcN (σ
2) := P and the stolen
information equal to (1 − c)NIAE(σ2) := I. Then, for
every σ2, we can again evaluate the curve P = P (I),
expressing Eve’s survival probability as a function of the
stolen bits. According to Fig. 10, the best choice for
Eve is a UGQCM with σ2 ≃ 0.3, which enables her to
steal about 10 bits of information before being detected.
Such a result is a strong improvement with respect to
the basic protocol, where 80 bits were left to Eve. Notice
that, for a low value of the noise like σ2 = 0.1, Eve gets
≃ 1 bit while Alice transmits ≃ 320 bits of information
by using N ≃ 1.1 × 104 systems. The maximal length
of QDC is here bounded by 4(1− c)(ncr)−1 ≃ 3500 bits,
i.e., N ≃ 1.2× 105 quantum systems.
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FIG. 10: Survival probability P versus the number of stolen
bits I . QDC with repetition code n = 35, and parameters Ω =
1 ≃ Ω˜, c = 1/2 (so that ε¯ ≃ 1% and E = 1/35). The curves
refer to individual UGQCM attacks with different values of
added noise σ2.
It is important to notice that the strong improvement
brought by the classical codes is proven provided the
eavesdropping strategy is fixed, i.e., Eve is restricted to
an individual Gaussian attack where all the signal sys-
tems are attacked by a UGQCM. The idea of using repe-
tition codes is in fact based on the condition that all the
9systems are perturbed exactly in the same way. However,
this is not true in general, and we can design more appro-
priate strategies for Eve, which are specifically optimized
against the use of classical codes. This is the argument
of the following section.
D. Non-Gaussian eavesdropping via intermittent
attacks
In the previous Section III C, the QDC with repetition
codes has been tested against the same kind of attack
considered for the basic QDC. This attack is an individ-
ual UGQCM attack, which is indeed a Gaussian attack
if it is applied to every quantum system which is sent
through the channel. Notice that the same Gaussian in-
teraction provided by the UGQCM generates an overall
non-Gaussian attack if it is applied to only a fraction of
the signal systems. This because an intermittent use of
Gaussian interactions corresponds to the generation of
an average non-Gaussian interaction.
In this section, we introduce the notion of intermittent
attacks which are individual non-Gaussian attacks based
on the intermittent use of a UGQCM. They are char-
acterized by two parameters: the frequency parameter
ω and the noise parameter σ2. The frequency parame-
ter ω defines the probability that Eve attacks a signal
system via a UGQCM (and, then, detects the output
clone via heterodyning). The noise parameter σ2 defines
the cloning noise variance which is introduced by the
UGQCM on the signals which are effectively attacked.
Then, for N transmitted systems, a fraction Nω is sub-
ject to cloning interactions with noise σ2, while another
fraction N(1− ω) is not perturbed by Eve. On average,
Bob’s output quadrature x = q, p will follow the non-
Gaussian distribution
Fω,σ2(x) = ωG1+σ2(x) + (1− ω)G1(x) , (34)
where G∆(x − x¯) is defined in Eq. (6). Clearly, in the
particular case of ω = 1, this attack becomes Gaussian
and coincides with an individual UGQCM attack.
An intermittent attack can allow Eve to probe a subset
of the systems very heavily, instead of probing all the sys-
tems with a weaker interaction. This peculiarity plays a
non-trivial role in the case of QDC with repetition codes,
where the eavesdropping of a single bit of a codeword can
be sufficient to reconstruct all the encoded logical infor-
mation. Here, we explicitly show the superiority of the
intermittent attacks against the use of repetition codes.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider only those attacks
whose frequencies can be written as ω = t/n, where n is
the length of the code and t is an odd integer between 1
and n.
After N runs of the protocol, an intermittent attack
of frequency ω (and noise σ2) will affect an average of
Nω systems, where cNω are in CM and (1− c)Nω are in
MM. Let us consider the MM first. For each codeword
of length n, there is an average of t = nω bits attacked
by Eve. Over these bits, Eve adopts the criterion of ma-
jority voting in order to reconstruct the codeword. As a
consequence, the probability of a logical error is equal to
the probability of having at least (t+ 1)/2 bit flips, i.e.,
PE(t) =
t∑
k= t+1
2
(
t
k
)
pk(1 − p)t−k , (35)
where p = p(∆E) is the single bit-flip probability in the
Alice-Eve channel, which is determined by ∆E = 1 +
(4σ2)−1. Then, for each MM, Eve extracts on average
IAE(σ
2, ω) = 2{1−H [PE(t)]}/n (36)
bits of information. AfterN runs of the protocol, we have
an average of (1 − c)N instances of MM and, therefore,
Eve has stolen I = (1 − c)NIAE(σ2, ω) bits of informa-
tion. Now, let us consider the CM. For each instance
of CM, Bob performs two hypothesis tests, so that an
average of 2cN tests are done after N runs of the pro-
tocol. Bob must distinguish between the two hypotheses
of Eq. (13), which here means to distinguish between the
two distributions Fω,0(x) = G1(x) (which is Gaussian)
and Fω,σ2 (x) with σ
2 6= 0 (which is non-Gaussian). Sup-
pose that Bob knows exactly which are the instances of
CM that are attacked by Eve. This assumption clearly
puts a lower bound on the eavesdropping capabilities of
Eve, which is however sufficient to prove the result. In
this case, Bob is able to isolate the cNω attacked in-
stances of CM from the cN(1−ω) instances which are not
attacked. On the attacked subset, Bob can now perform
2cNω tests in order to distinguish between two Gaus-
sian distributions, i.e., G1+σ2 (x) and G1(x). Then, we
have to consider the estimator of Eq. (14), but now with
M = cNω. As a consequence, the survival probabil-
ity of Eve after N runs of the protocol is now given by
P = ΠcNω(σ
2).
For every intermittent attack specified by the pair
{ω, σ2}, we can now relate the survival probability P
to the number of stolen bits I, i.e., we can consider the
function P = P (I). By adopting the previous parameters
for the QDC protocol, i.e., n = 35, Ω = 1 and c = 1/2,
we derive the curves of Fig. 11 for different values of the
pair {ω, σ2}. In particular, we have chosen the frequen-
cies ω in the set {1, 1/7, 3/35, 1/35} and taken the corre-
sponding optimal noises σ2 which maximize Eve’s stolen
information. As expected, the value of the optimal noise
increases for decreasing frequency. In particular, the best
performance is achieved for ω = 1/35 (lowest frequency)
and σ2 = 0.4 (highest noise), where Eve is able to eaves-
drop 20 bits. Notice that this value is actually a lower
bound on Eve’s capabilities, i.e., Eve is able to steal at
least 20 bits. In fact, except for the case ω = 1 (Gaussian
attack), all the curves are actually lower bounds on the
actual performances of Eve. Nevertheless, this is suffi-
cient to prove the superiority of the intermittent attacks
in the eavesdropping of QDC with repetition codes. No-
tice that the actual performances of these non-Gaussian
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attacks could be much better. It is not excluded that
they could completely annul the advantages brought by
the use of the classical codes.
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FIG. 11: Survival probability P versus the number of stolen
bits I . QDC with repetition code n = 35, and parameters
Ω = 1 ≃ Ω˜, c = 1/2 (so that ε¯ ≃ 1% and E = 1/35). The
curves refer to intermittent attacks with different parameters
(ω,σ2). In particular, we have chosen ω = 1, 1/7, 3/35, 1/35
and the corresponding optimal noises σ2 = 0.3, 0.35, 0.39, 0.4 .
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have thoroughly reviewed the results
of Ref. [6], and we have also provided a deeper analy-
sis of possible eavesdropping strategies. In particular,
the usage of classical correcting codes for QDC leads to
the birth of new kind of attacks, the intermittent at-
tacks, which are non-Gaussian and outperform the stan-
dard Gaussian attacks considered in Ref. [6]. Because
of this new strategy, the real advantages of using clas-
sical codes for QDC are not completely clear. Despite
this open problem, the adoption of a basic QDC, with
a suitable control mode probability, always enables the
honest users to decrease the number of stolen bits to any
desired value. Clearly, this is done at the expenses of
the efficiency of the protocol. This trade-off between the
degree of privacy and efficiency of the protocol is quite
intuitive in our derivation. In future work, it would be
interesting to investigate the existence of a precise re-
lation between these two quantities. However, in order
to derive this kind of relation, the cryptoanalysis of the
QDC should be first extended to more general eavesdrop-
ping models, e.g., collective Gaussian attacks involving
the use of beam-splitters with thermal inputs, or more
general Gaussian interactions [15]. At the present stage,
our protocols represent a simple proof-of-principle of a
confidential QDC in the framework of continuous vari-
able systems, whose performances are not definitive at all
and could be greatly improved in future investigations.
As already discussed in Ref. [6], our protocols for
QDC allow an effective communication only when a small
amount of noise affects the quantum channel, thus re-
stricting their current application to relatively short dis-
tances. Despite this restriction, there are however non-
trivial situations where they can be used in a profitable
way. As explained in Ref. [6], one of the possible appli-
cations is mutual entity authentication [16], where the
two users identify each other by comparing the bits of
a pre-distributed and secret authentication key. In this
case, the usage of QDC is particularly profitable in the
presence of quantum impersonation attacks [17], which
are promptly revealed by relatively small sessions of our
basic protocol.
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VI. APPENDIX: POSSIBLE VARIANTS FOR
QDC
Here we briefly present several possible variants of the
previous protocols.
A. QDC using homodyne detector
Simple variants of the previous protocols for QDC can
be implemented via homodyne instead of heterodyne de-
tection. It is sufficient that Alice encodes one single bit
in the lattice by setting U = U ′. Then, Bob randomly
switches between qˆ and pˆ measurements, the exact se-
quence being communicated to Alice at the end of the
quantum communication. In such a case, Eve is forced
to a delayed-choice strategy, where she has to keep all
her ancillas before making the correct homodyne mea-
surement on each of them. Similar results can be easily
proven for these variants by considering that now the
measurement noise is ∆ = 1/2.
B. Unifying control and message modes
Whenever the QDC is based on heterodyne detection
and implemented with a control mode probability c =
1/2 (as in the case of the protocol of Sec. III B), one can
decide to distribute the control and message modes on
all the quantum systems. This is possible by randomly
choosing a quadrature for the encoding and the other for
the check. Then, after Bob’s heterodyne detection, Alice
declares the quadrature to be used for public comparison.
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C. Postponed QDC
In the basic protocol of Sec. II, run-by-run and after
Bob’s detection, Alice declares which mode she has used
(MM or CM) and the corresponding classical informa-
tion (mask amplitude αM or signal amplitude α¯). An
alternative protocol consists in delaying this declaration
until the end of the quantum communication. At that
point, Alice will only declare the instances in CM and
the corresponding amplitudes. Such a procedure enables
Alice and Bob to evaluate the noise of the channel be-
fore revealing any confidential information. From such
an estimation, Alice computes the amount of informa-
tion IAE that Eve can steal if she unmasks the message.
If IAE is negligible (according to a pre-agreed tolerance
level), then Alice unmasks all the message modes, com-
municating her message to Bob. Otherwise, she has to
abort. Alternatively, when IAE is not negligible but less
than IAB , Alice and Bob can possibly use the remaining
systems for distributing a secret key. Notice that such
a postponed protocol takes no advantage from the use
of codes. Furthermore, it can be simply implemented
with c = 1/2 and, therefore, also modified according to
Sec. VI B.
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